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Standard economic theories of asset markets assume that assets are valued entirely for the
consumption streams they can ¯nance. This paper examines the introduction of the demand
for status (as a function of wealth) into a model of uninsurable idiosyncratic risk. We ¯nd that
spirit of capitalism preferences lead to less inequality in wealth and more in consumption. They
also imply very di®erent responses to a move from a progressive to a °at income tax; with spirit
of capitalism preferences, wealth inequality goes down when the economy moves to a °at tax
regime.
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Our interest in this paper is to evaluate the implications of a particular preference structure for the
wealth distribution: we assume agents value wealth directly. We consider a simple speci¯cation
in which agents value wealth because it gives them status. As in Bakshi and Chen (1996), we let
status be a function of individual wealth; agents thus have an additional motivation to accumulate
assets. The standard speci¯cation { Aiyagari (1994) { generates saving only for precautionary pur-
poses, since the interest rate is strictly below the rate of time preference. As a result, agents stop
accumulating wealth as soon as they become su±ciently well-insured. Our model adds another
e®ect { higher wealth confers utility directly as well as indirectly through consumption purchases.
This preference structure can also be motivated by appeals to home production technologies, in
which certain components of wealth are used to produce home consumption goods, but the inter-
actions in those models are considerably more complicated due to the ¯xed nature of home capital
and the issue of time use.
These preferences have been shown to improve asset-pricing models by Bakshi and Chen (1996),
Smith (2001), and Kenc and Diboo¸ glu (2003), to a®ect long-run growth by Zou (1994), and to
change the implications of taxation for growth by Gong and Zou (2002).1 In addition, Carroll
(2002) examines the implications of valuing wealth directly { albeit only after one dies, leaving a
bequest { for the portfolio decisions of households, ¯nding that this speci¯cation is better able to
match the portfolios of the rich. However, it remains an open question how preference for wealth
changes the implications of general equilibrium models like the ones considered here. We ¯nd that
increasing the weight placed on status decreases the concentration of wealth in our economy and
raises the e®ective lower bound on wealth, holding constant discount factors and leisure weights.
When we recalibrate the economy to the same equilibrium prices, we ¯nd that increasing the weight
on status leads to a collapsing wealth distribution as the lower discount factor reduces the upper
bound on wealth. At the same time, the distribution of consumption is spreading out. If we allow
for the possibility that status is a luxury good, then we can counterbalance the tendency for the
wealth distribution to collapse, but we cannot produce an increase in the Gini coe±cient from the
standard preference case. This result di®ers from Reiter (2004), who ¯nds that nonhomethetic
preferences of wealth can improve the ¯t of the model for the very wealthy, but it is di±cult to
1However, this improvement in asset pricing may be illusory due to the failure of the papers to impose all the
restrictions implied by the model; see Lettau (1997) for a discussion. A related paper (Chue 2004) considers the
e®ects of spirit of capitalism on international risk sharing.
1assess the di®erences because the models considered are very di®erent.
The concern for status also impacts the distribution of hours worked. When the parameter
governing the spirit of capitalism is increased, holding constant the capital/output ratio and the
aggregate hours worked, the distribution shifts hours in a rather complicated way. For low values
of the parameter, increases lead to increases in the correlation between hours and productivity,
meaning that aggregate productivity rises. However, when this value gets bigger, the e®ects
undergo two turns, at ¯rst falling and then rising again. The Gini coe±cients for hours are negative
at the calibrated equilibrium and increase to positive as the preference for status gets stronger.
When the economy is recalibrated, the Gini coe±cients converge to zero from below, implying
that the Lorenz curve for hours will approach the 45± line from above. Having nonhomothetic
preferences for status has no impact on the hours distribution, as those households most a®ected
by nonhomotheticity are the wealthy, and they are not supplying very much labor.
In the ¯nal section of the paper, we explore the implications of our alternative preferences
for taxation. Given that the preferences we consider are capable of producing the same Gini
coe±cients on wealth as standard ones, it is important to assess whether the predictions for the
e®ects of policies are also similar. We calibrate the model to the US progressive tax system and
then compute two reforms, replacing the progressive tax with a °at income tax and with a °at
consumption tax. As is common in the literature, we ¯nd that standard preferences imply that
the consumption tax reform results in higher average utility. However, with spirit of capitalism
preferences, this ranking is reversed; agents would prefer the income tax. With the income tax,
there is a higher probability of being very wealthy, an outcome which is somewhat surprising, and
this higher tail mass generates a large welfare gain for a household who values wealth directly.
Our paper is organized as follows. First, we detail our model economy. Then we present our
results regarding the relationship between the strength of the demand for wealth and the distri-
butions of wealth, consumption, and hours for three cases { separable and homothetic, separable
and nonhomothetic, and nonseparable and homothetic. The third conducts experiments which
change the tax system from progressive to °at. The conclusion wraps up the paper and points to
directions along which we feel research can fruitfully proceed.
2. The Model Economy
Our model economy will feature partially uninsurable labor income risk and markets will be exoge-
nously incomplete; we will allow households to hold only aggregate capital for savings, and holdings
2of this asset are restricted by an exogenous borrowing limit. However, the household can supply
labor endogenously to smooth consumption.
2.1. The Environment
We consider a model economy with a large (measure 1) population of in¯nitely-lived consumers as
in Aiyagari (1994). There is only one consumption good per period and we assume that all agents





where us(ct;st) > 0 (higher status is strictly preferred), uss(ct;st) < 0 as discussed in Robson
(1992), and the cross-derivative is unrestricted. We will con¯ne ourselves to the class of utility











our choice is dictated by the observation that the return to capital has been stationary over the




will be assumed to possess the following properties:
(1) it is strictly increasing in the investor's absolute wealth at time t, so that higher wealth means
higher status regardless of the wealth distribution for the group of people with whom the investor
has social or professional contacts; (2) it is a function of the social group to which this individual
belongs. That is, we have sW > 0 and sW < 0. In our economy, we will assume that Wt is the
individual capital stock kt. In the above utility function, ¾ > 0 is the coe±cient of relative risk
aversion, µ > 0 controls the demand for the status good, and ° > 0 determines the degree to which
status is a luxury.
Each agent is endowed with one unit of time with a stochastic productivity y. The budget
constraint for the household is
c + k0 · (r + 1 ¡ ±)k + ywh (2.3)
where r is the rental rate on capital, ± 2 [0;1] is the depreciation rate, w is the wage rate, h is labor
supply, and y is the idiosyncratic productivity factor. Endogenous labor supply is an important
feature in our economy. As µ rises, the level of capital in our economy will rise signi¯cantly due to
a strong demand for status. This increase will push the capital/labor ratio much too high if labor
3input is ¯xed, even if ¯ is allowed to adjust.
We assume that y is generated by a Markov process with stationary transitions described by a
vector of realizations fyg and transition probabilities [¼ij]. The time allocation constraint is
1 = h + l:
Capital is restricted to be nonnegative:
k0 ¸ 0:
The technology produces output Y as a Cobb-Douglas function of capital input K and labor
input N
Y = K®N1¡®:
Output can be transformed into future capital K0 and current consumption C according to
C + K0 ¡ (1 ¡ ±)K = Y: (2.4)
2.2. The Market Arrangement
Consumers collect income from working and from the services of their capital. If the total amount
of capital in the economy is denoted K and the total amount of labor supply is denoted H, the
CRTS production function implies that the relevant ¯rst order conditions are
w(K;N) = (1 ¡ ®)(K=N)® (2.5)
and
r(K;N) = ®(K=N)¡®: (2.6)
We consider a recursive equilibrium de¯nition, which includes a law of motion for the aggregate
state of the economy as a key element. The aggregate state of the economy is the current measure
(distribution) of consumers over holdings of capital and productivity, which we denote by ¡. For
the individual agent, the optimization problem can therefore be expressed as follows:
v(k;y) = max
1¸h¸0;c¸0;k0¸kb
fu(c;s;1 ¡ h) + ¯E[v(k0;y0)jy]g (2.7)
4subject to
c + k0 = r(K;N)k + w(K;N)hy + (1 ¡ ±)k (2.8)
s = F(k) (2.9)
and the stochastic law of motion for y. The decision rule for the updating of capital coming out
of the problem is denoted by the function ¼k(k;y) and the one for labor is denoted ¼h (k;y).
De¯nition 1. A recursive competitive equilibrium is a value function v (k;y), decision rules
¼k (k;y) and ¼h (k;y), pricing functions r(K;N) and w(K;N), and a law of motion G(¡) such
that
(i) (v;¼k;¼h) solves the consumers' problems given prices and the law of motion;
(ii) r and w are consistent with the ¯rm's ¯rst-order conditions;
(iii) G is generated by f, i.e., the appropriate summing up of agents' optimal choices of capital
given their current state.
(iv) The goods market clears: C + K0 = K®N1¡® + (1 ¡ ±)K:
(v) Factor markets clear: N =
R
y¼h (k;y)¡(k;y) and K =
R
k¡(k;y)
Our goal is to ¯nd stationary equilibria, so we seek only the ¯xed point of the law of motion
¡¤ = G(¡¤)
and need not compute the law of motion explicitly.2
3. Results
We now present our results. Since the model will not produce a distribution with a known form
(see Aiyagari 1994 or Young 2003 for discussions of the shape of the distributions produced) we use
numerical methods to derive results. Our algorithm for solving the model follows Young (2004)
{ see the technical appendix of that paper for explicit details. Brie°y, we do the following: (1)
2In a previous version of the paper we explored the business cycle dynamics of this model using tools developed
in Young (2002). The impact of wealth in the utility function was trivial.
5Guess an rental rate r; (2) Solve the consumer problem using value iteration with cubic spline
interpolation and Howard's improvement algorithm; (3) Compute an invariant distribution using
iterative redistribution of mass at each point; and (4) Update r using Brent's method until the
capital market clears. When calibrating the model, we add an outer loop which guesses values
for (¯;¹) and updates them according to a multivariate secant method with one-sided numerical
derivatives until they converge. One thing we point out here is that the usual upper bound derived
for the interest rate in an incomplete market model will hold here in a stronger form. With
complete markets, the steady-state is de¯ned by
uc (c;s;l) = ¯ [uc (c;s;l)(r + 1 ¡ ±) + us (c;s;l)]
or





r ¡ ± =




the additional term ¡us
uc is the steady-state marginal rate of substitution between status and con-
sumption. With the utility function we will choose below, the expression becomes
r ¡ ± =




Since this term is positive, the steady-state interest rate is strictly lower than without status in the
utility function. In our economy without complete markets, there is an upper bound on r implied
by this equation, as in Aiyagari (1994). Since us
uc is not equal for all households, we instead obtain
the bound








this bound was veri¯ed numerically across a wide variety of parameterizations { see Figure 1.
Of course, since the right-hand-side contains variables which are themselves functions of r, we
cannot actually compute the upper bound for r as a function of parameters. But results from the
consumption literature can be used to show that as k goes to in¯nity, c
k+° converges from above to
6some value Â < 1, which implies that our bound is







Â must be less than one since r ¡ ± is less than one and labor supply is zero for su±ciently high
wealth.
3.1. Baseline Model
In this section we discuss our baseline model. In this model, we specify status as in Bakshi and
Chen (1996),
s = k; (3.1)
and set ° = 0; status has no luxury \feel" to it. We let risk aversion be set to 1; the resulting
preferences are represented by
u(c;s;l) = log(c) + µlog(s) + ¹log(1 ¡ h):
For calibration, we choose ¯ to match a capital/output ratio of 11:5, ± to match an invest-
ment/output ratio of 0:25, and ¹ to generate average hours of 0:3271 percent of the time en-
dowment. There is little consensus on the value of µ; we therefore consider many di®erent values
in an attempt to uncover the model's relationship between status and wealth concentration. To
ensure that we can fairly assess this feature, we recalibrate (¯;±;¹) for each value of µ considered
in the range [0;5:0]. As evidence that the interval of values we consider encompasses a reasonable
range, we note that Luo (2002) estimates a value of µ around 0:54, with a standard error of 0:0119,
for an otherwise standard growth model using Generalized Method of Moments.
Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2001) argue that the speci¯cation of labor income for an
individual household must allow for persistent and transitory components. Based on their empirical
work from PSID data, we specify log(yi) to be
log(yi) = !i + ²i (3.2)
!0
i = ½!i + v0
i (3.3)





is the transitory component and !i is the persistent component. The inno-





. Storesletten, Telmer, and
Yaron (2001) estimate ½ = 0:935, ¾2
º = 0:01, and ¾2





1 ¡ ½2 + ¾2
º = 0:14051:
This process attributes about half the unconditional variance to the persistent component and half
to the transitory component. We then approximate this process with a seven-state Markov chain
using the Tauchen (1986) procedure. This process will not generate su±cient income inequality
to replicate the observed Gini coe±cient of wealth; however, it is su±cient to demonstrate how
the parameter µ a®ects inequality, and our results will not be completely unreasonable given that
we have abstracted from other factors that presumably generate wealth inequality (like di®erential
returns on assets and bequests).3
Our concern here is the relationship between concern for status and the wealth distribution.
Figure 2 presents the wealth distributions from several of the cases covered in Table 1.4 We can
see from both the table and the ¯gure that increasing µ has the following e®ects (keeping in mind
that the wealth/income ratio and aggregate hours are kept constant):
1. The standard deviation of the wealth distribution shrinks;
2. The skewness of the wealth distribution converges to zero;
3. The kurtosis of the wealth distribution shrinks;
4. The Gini coe±cient goes to zero.
Thus, we see that adding concern for wealth into the utility function of the household leads the
wealth distribution to collapse. Figure 3 graphs the Lorenz curves for the data and the baseline
model with and without concern for status. It is obvious that when we increase the concern for the
status the wealth distribution becomes more equal and converges to the 45± line. The contraction
of the wealth distribution has several components. One, agents are risk averse toward gambles over
status; that is, they prefer to smooth status, and by extension, wealth. Since the economy possesses
3For a reference point, the data for the U.S. examined in Budr¶ ³a et.al. (2002) imply a Gini coe±cient of wealth
of 0:78 whereas our benchmark case generates a value of 0:55. We could easily add permanent skill di®erences, as in
Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2001) and bring the model exactly into line with the data, but it would not change
any of the results on which we focus.
4The small irregular spikes occur at points where households in productivity state y hit the zero constraint on
hours. We did not include the distributions for the higher values of µ because they are simply more pronounced
versions of the µ = 0:5 case and scaling starts to become an issue.
8an ergodic distribution and satis¯es the mixing conditions discussed in Aiyagari and Alvarez (1996),
each household understands that they will visit each point in the state space in¯nitely often over
their in¯nite life; that is, the ergodic distribution is simultaneously the cross-sectional distribution
at a point in time and the distribution of an individual over time. Risk aversion over wealth
compels them to make this ergodic set smaller, which is exactly what they do. To get a handle on
the size of this e®ect, we include in Table 1a the highest and lowest levels of wealth observed in our
distribution (we carry the computation out to 10 decimal places, all of which we require to be zero)
for each value of µ.5 The maximum value of k decreases rapidly as µ increases, lending support
to the idea that households are reducing the size of their ergodic set. In addition, as µ increases
the minimum value of k observed increases, as agents become less willing to hold low amounts of
wealth. If we allow µ to go to in¯nity, the ergodic distribution converges to a single point.6
The mean levels of wealth are not the same across the economies, despite the fact that the
capital/output ratio and the total hours worked are forced to be equal. The reason this result
holds is that there is a change in the distribution of hours across each economy. As noted in
Pijoan-Mas (2004), shifts in the distribution of hours between low to high-productivity workers can
alter the amount of precautionary savings. Table 1 presents the correlation between productivity
and hours across values of µ. Starting from µ = 0, the correlation initially rises with µ; this
continues until µ reaches a critical value somewhere between 0:0 and 0:5, where it begins to decline.
When demand for status is initially low, increasing it results in a shift of aggregate hours toward
the productive, leading to higher aggregate productivity. As µ continues to rise, however, this
relationship reverses itself, producing low productivity workers who supply a lot of labor to get
their wealth and status to increase. However, when µ begins to get very large, the correlation
again begins to rise; this occurs above µ = 5:0.7
The decreases in wealth concentration are quite large in the economy { an increase in µ to 0:1
causes a 43 percent decline in the Gini coe±cient. However, since we recalibrate the economy, it
is di±cult to distinguish the direct e®ect of increasing µ from the required decline in ¯ needed to
match the average amount of wealth. As ¯ declines, households have shorter horizons and thus
5It is important to note here that our invariant distribution is not constructed using a ¯nite simulation, meaning
that sample size concerns are not an issue. See the technical appendix to Young (2004) for further explanation.
6We con¯rmed this fact by computing a version of the model with µ = 10000, which resulted in all the mass of
the invariant distribution being located over two points in the grid, those which bracket the desired aggregate stock
of capital.
7When µ = 10000:0, the case that leads to a near-complete collapse of the wealth distribution, the correlation
between h and y is 0:8758.
9tend to accumulate less wealth in general. With a lower upper bound and a ¯xed lower bound
on wealth, the Gini coe±cient will naturally decline as more agents have su±ciently good luck to
reach their endogenous upper bound. To examine this possibility, we hold ¯ ¯xed at the calibrated
value for the benchmark and examine how the wealth distribution changes when µ changes. The
results are presented in Table 2a; with ¯xed ¯, the level of wealth increases dramatically but the
concentration of wealth still shrinks. However, the ergodic set does not shrink; rather, it increases
in size and dispersion in wealth actually increases. It is curious to note that the net return on
capital r ¡ ± becomes negative when µ rises su±ciently high; for example, when µ = 5:0 the net
return to capital with a ¯xed (¯;¹;±) vector is ¡0:0012. Since wealth is still producing status,
it is demanded despite its negative value as a savings vehicle; if households could store goods this
return could never go below 0.
In Figure 4, we present the equilibrium in the asset market. Since r ¡ ± < 1
¯ ¡ 1 for the case
when µ = 0:0, households are only saving for precautionary purposes. When µ increases and we
hold (¯;¹;±) ¯xed, asset supply shifts to the right. At every r ¡ ± households supply more assets
to the capital market. Since households now demand assets directly for status purposes, they hold
more assets which they rent to the market. In addition, there is an increase in aggregate labor
input, shifting asset demand to the right. The computation shows that the shift in supply exceeds
the shift in demand, leading to a drop in r ¡ ± from 0:0096 to 0:0046 and a rise in K
N from 45:429
to 59:724. When the economy is recalibrated, it ends up back at the same equilibrium, but the
process is more complicated. To increase the interest rate and reduce the capital-labor ratio, we
need something to shift the asset supply curve backward; this shift is accomplished by reducing ¯.
In addition we need to shift capital demand back as well; by increasing ¹ we reduce aggregate labor
input and reduce the marginal product of capital, shifting capital demand to the left. Properly






The °ipside to smoothing wealth is that consumption may now be less insulated against °uc-
tuations. To examine this possibility, we compute the cross-sectional distribution of consumption
in the steady state. As µ increases, we observe the following facts from Table 1b:
1. Mean consumption falls { the substitution e®ect caused by increases in the demand for status
is larger than the wealth e®ect generated by additional capital and the direct increase caused
by falling ¯;
2. The standard deviation of consumption rises { consumption becomes more exposed to income
10risk as the demand to smooth status induces smoother asset positions;
3. Skewness in consumption rises;
4. Kurtosis in consumption rises and then falls;
5. The Gini coe±cient for consumption rises.
Thus, we see some evidence that consumption is being exposed to more risk. As before, we
cannot easily make statements about the e®ect of µ on consumption, since it is contaminated by
the required changes in ¯. Table 2b presents the distribution of consumption statistics when ¯ is
held ¯xed; it is clear that the increase in the Gini coe±cient is the result of recalibration. However,
there is a nonmonotonic e®ect on the standard deviation of consumption; it initially rises and then
falls. The eventual decline in the standard deviation is the result of the massive increases in wealth
evident in Table 2a; with more wealth, agents are more able to self-insure against movements in
their income. At low levels for µ, however, increases in µ have the e®ect of raising the standard
deviation of consumption. Furthermore, the nonmonotonic behavior of the correlation between
hours and productivity disappears; as µ rises, there is an increase in this correlation; the most
productive agents begin to work more to accumulate additional wealth and status, and this shift
produces an increase in aggregate productivity.
In this speci¯cation, there is a strong disincentive to be very poor; the marginal utility of status
goes to in¯nity as wealth goes to zero. Unlike the standard model, all of our households will
hold positive stocks of assets even when there is no possibility of drawing zero income in a given
period (as in our model). We can easily see this from Table 1a, where the minimum wealth in
the distribution rises signi¯cantly as µ increases from zero.8 Thus, counterfactually the model
with ° = 0 predicts zero consumers who have zero wealth, and preferences are not even de¯ned
for negative levels of wealth. Unfortunately for this preference speci¯cation, Budr¶ ³a et.al. (2001)
report 9:9 percent of all households have zero or negative wealth. Clearly, this model is incapable
of reproducing this observation; we will therefore examine how nonhomotheticity in the preference
for status a®ects the wealth distribution.9
8Again, we wish to point out that this increase in the observed lower bound for wealth is not the result of simulation
error, as our method for constructing the invariant distribution does not use ¯nite simulations.
9There are other models in which the assumption that preferences have spirit of capitalism would be problematic.
For example, in the debt-constrained environment considered in Krueger (1999), banishment to autarky would involve
utility equal to ¡1, meaning that perfect risk sharing could be sustained.
113.2. Nonhomothetic Preferences
We now consider Stone-Geary preferences over status; these preferences can allow households to
consider negative wealth positions. Although we now de¯ne utility over negative wealth positions,
we do not allow households to borrow; we make this assumption to maintain comparability across
model speci¯cations. In the appendix we show that if ° > 0 and µ < 1:0 status will be a luxury
good. This assumption would seem plausible given that membership in country clubs, philanthropic
contributions, and other status-enhancing activities are strongly correlated with wealth.10 Carroll
(2002) suggests that nonhomothetic preferences over wealth (in his formulation, bequests) can
account for the portfolios chosen by the very wealthy, while Reiter (2004) argues that it can help
account for the savings behavior of the very wealthy.
° is di±cult to calibrate given no obvious target. In fact, it is not even clear what factors of
the wealth distribution ° most directly in°uences. Therefore, as we did in the previous section, we
explore various settings of µ for ° = 15:6, which is the average level of wealth in the ° = 0:0 and
° = 15:6 economies (since we recalibrate (¯;¹;±) in each case). To get a sense of how ° impacts
choices, we consider a static problem in which a household must allocate consumption between two
consumption goods and has logarithmic preferences:
max
s;c flog(c) + µlog(s + °)g:
Denote income by m and the relative price of status by p. In this case, the demand functions








that is, as ° increases, consumption of status decreases and consumption of other goods increases.
For example, when µ = 1:0 and ° = 5:0 (setting m = 10 and p = 1) we have that status is s = 2:5,
25 percent of income, but increasing ° to 7:5 yields status being 1:25, which is now only 12:5
percent of income. That is, in our model ° mutes the demand for wealth by reducing the impact
of k on the marginal utility of status; because savings functions will not be exactly linear in our
10This would follow directly from Veblen's notion of conspicuous consumption; large philanthropic gifts confer
status both because they are large (which requires high wealth) and because they are very public.
12environment, the elasticity will not be 1 as it is in the example. Furthermore, it implies that some
households will choose not to pursue status, since the marginal utility will be ¯nite at s = 0; that
is, for the relatively poor status will not be purchased. Furthermore, increasing wealth will not





















In our formulation, this implies there is no wealth demand increase for the very poor when µ
increases.
When we compute our model with ° = 15:6, we see that the Gini coe±cient on wealth is higher
for every value of µ considered (we did not compute the µ = 5:0 economy because, as shown in the
appendix, that economy does not imply status is a luxury, but rather is a necessity). Additionally,
the ergodic set of capital stocks shrinks much more slowly than when ° = 0, and the lower bound
remains at the borrowing limit instead of rising. Standard deviations are also smaller in this case.
In e®ect, making status a luxury good has the perverse e®ect of reducing inequality rather than
increasing it, which is what our intuition suggested would happen. What ° is doing is muting the
increased demand for capital by reducing the marginal utility of status for every agent. Further
increases in ° (for example, to twice the average amount of capital) increase the Gini coe±cient
on wealth. Reiter (2004) uses a value which is equal to 30,000 times the capital/output ratio in
his economy. When we solve this economy, we ¯nd that the Gini coe±cient is nearly the same
when µ = 0:1 as when µ = 0:0. Nonhomothetic preferences over status cannot increase the Gini
coe±cient, however, as further increases in ° have little to no e®ect on inequality.11 This result
obtains in our economy because, with separable preferences, as ° ! 1 the households behave
identically to ones with µ = 0; with an arbitarily large constant in the utility function, status is
una®ected by wealth. ° > 0 has little e®ect on the distribution of hours, which is to be expected
since it primarily a®ects the wealthy and these households supply little labor.
11The cuto® value of ° (that is, where further increases have no e®ect on the wealth distribution) depends on the
endogenous choice of the observed upper bound for k (which of course is determined by °). As µ rises, this cuto®
value for ° falls.
133.3. Non-Separable Preferences { The E®ect of Risk Aversion







where ¾ ¸ 0. There are two e®ects typically associated with rising values for ¾. First, it
increases the amount of precautionary savings in its role as the Arrow-Pratt coe±cient of relative
risk aversion; when ¾ increases, households become more averse to °uctuations in the components
of period utility and they therefore react by increasing savings in such a way as to reduce those
°uctuations. Here, this precautionary savings e®ect is strengthened because wealth is a component
of the period utility function itself; it is therefore directly subject to risk aversion as noted above.
The second e®ect of increasing ¾ is to reduce the general desire for savings in its role in determining
the elasticity of intertemporal substitution; when µ = 0, the EIS in consumption is given by ¾¡1.
As we show in the appendix, the EIS here is still negatively related to ¾, but has a wedge term
that depends on the demand for status in a manner similar to the habit formation preferences
considered in D¶ ³az, Pijoan-Mas, and R¶ ³os-Rull (2003). With lower savings desires, consumption
°uctuations are exacerbated by the presence of more households in the region of wealth near the
borrowing limit.12
Because computing the model with ¾ > 1 is considerably more di±cult than with ¾ = 1, we
only report the model with µ = (0:0;0:1) at ¾ = 4:0. The problem with solving this model is
the curvature in the utility function near the borrowing constraint. As k ! 0 the utility function
(when ° = 0) converges to ¡1; near this point, the extremely high values for the derivative make
it hard to accurately solve for the policy function. Other values for µ appear to lead to the same
qualitative conclusions, but we did not compute them to very high accuracy. The ¯rst thing to
note is that mean capital goes down slightly when ¾ goes from 1:0 to 4:0, despite the fact that
the economies have the same wealth/GDP ratio and the same aggregate hours; this is another
manifestation of the e®ects of reallocating labor across productivity groups. With higher risk
aversion, the less productive workers supply a higher proportion of total hours, leading to declines
in aggregate productivity. As seen above when ¾ = 1:0, the result of increasing µ is to reduce the
12Technically speaking, we cannot di®erentiate the e®ects of risk aversion and the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution, since both depend on ¾. While we derive an expression for the EIS in the appendix, and therefore
could recalibrate it to produce the same EIS by adjusting the strength of the status parameter µ, we do not do so
both because the e®ects would not appear to be strong and because our interest lies in the e®ects of µ.
14Gini coe±cient on wealth, producing less inequality.13 Adding nonhomotheticity to the high risk
aversion economies had the same e®ect as above.
4. Tax Policy
In this ¯nal substantive section of the paper, we consider some experiments designed to explore
whether spirit of capitalism preferences have any substantive impact on the evaluation of certain
types of taxes. Speci¯cally, we consider the replacement of a progressive income tax with two
di®erent °at tax systems { an income tax system and a consumption tax system. Our °at income
tax experiments are similar in spirit to those conducted by Casta~ neda, D¶ ³az-Gim¶ enez, and R¶ ³os-Rull
(2002) and Conesa and Krueger (2004), who compute the welfare and distributional consequences
of replacing a calibrated progressive tax system with a revenue-neutral °at tax. Our interest is not
in a careful measurement of the relative gain from reforming the tax system, but rather to assess
whether spirit of capitalism preferences have consequences for these types of policy experiments.
We ¯nd that they do.
Following Gouveia and Strauss (1994), we choose to approximate the existing income tax code
using the function
¿ (i) = a0
µ





with parameters (a0;a1;a2). As noted in those papers mentioned above, the tax rate is not
invariant to a rescaling of income, so we take the same approach as in Conesa and Krueger (2004):
we set a0 = 0:258, a1 = 0:768, and calibrate a2 to balance the government budget when wasteful
spending is 19 percent of GDP. The budget constraint of the household is now given by
(1 + ¿c)c + k0 = (1 + r ¡ ±)k + wyh ¡ ¿ (i) (4.2)
where
i = (r ¡ ±)k + wyh (4.3)
is personal income and ¿c is a consumption tax. The government budget constraint is given by
Z
(¿cc + ¿ (i))¡(k;y) = G: (4.4)
13Increasing ¾ has the e®ect of reducing inequality as well, since fewer households are willing to hold very small
amounts of capital.
15The goods market becomes
C + K0 + G = Y + (1 ¡ ±)K: (4.5)
The de¯nition of equilibrium needs only to be modi¯ed to account for these two changes.
When switching to a °at income tax, we set the tax rate ¿ to keep the ratio G
Y constant at 19
percent when the consumption tax is set to zero. For the consumption tax experiments, we set the
tax rate ¿c to again imply a G
Y ratio of 19 percent when the income tax function is set identically
to zero. We chose to keep the G
Y ratio constant to isolate the disincentive e®ects of the various




v (k;y)¡¤ (k;y) (4.6)
in which each agent evaluates the reform "before they are born." That is, this is a comparison done
by an agent who is being asked to insert themselves into one of the two economies; being measure
zero they have no impact on the equilibrium in the economy and can therefore fairly assess the
consequences of living in each world. We then convert this utility measure into consumption units
and calculate the welfare change as
Á = exp((1 ¡ ¯)(W1 ¡ W0)) ¡ 1; (4.7)
where W0 is welfare before the reform and W1 is after. We compare our results for the two
experiments using µ = 0:0 and (µ;°) = f0:5;32g, since they imply approximately the same Gini
coe±cients for wealth; in each case, we recalibrate (¯;±;¹) to reproduce the same facts as above and
we keep ¾ = 1 ¯xed across each of these tax experiments.14 Since we are comparing two economies
which are identical in wage distributions and very similar in terms of wealth distributions, we hope
to attribute any di®erences across policy experiments to be the result of (µ;°).15
In the model economy with spirit of capitalism, the income tax is not "pure." Since households
derive direct utility from wealth, the income tax, which changes the relative price of assets, is
inducing a shift away from status and toward consumption. To see this more clearly, consider a
14We do not attempt to search for the optimal tax code, as is done in Conesa and Krueger (2004). Our paper is
not the only one in which nonstandard preferences have been used to explore the progressive income tax; see Boskin
and Sheshiski (1978) and Corneo (2000).
15Without computing transitional dynamics, we cannot initialize the experiments with the same distribution,
because one of them would have additional dynamics.
16two period model with inelastic labor supply
max
c1;c2;k2¸0
u(c1;c2;s1;s2) = [log(c1) + µlog(k1 + °)] + ¯ [log(c2) + µlog(k2 + °)] (4.8)
subject to the budget constraints
(1 + ¿c)c1 + k2 · (1 + r1 ¡ ±)k1 + w1 ¡ ¿ [(r1 ¡ ±)k1 + w1] (4.9)
(1 + ¿c)c2 · (1 + r2 ¡ ±)k2 + w2 ¡ ¿ [(r2 ¡ ±)k2 + w2]:




¯ (1 + ¿c)
c2




where ¤ is the multiplier on the nonnegativity constraint for k2. To obtain one unit of status
tomorrow, the household must sacri¯ce 1
(1+¿c) units of consumption today (this comes from the
¯rst budget constraint). However, the household also gets additional consumption tomorrow
because wealth confers status, so that the e®ective price of status is reduced by the second term on
the left-hand-side of the Euler equation. Thus, income taxes, by reducing the wedge term, raise
the e®ective price of status and induce shifts in the consumption bundle, similar to a nonuniform
consumption tax. The condition also clearly shows that even constant consumption taxes have an
intertemporal e®ect by decreasing the relative price of status, an e®ect which is not present with
standard preferences.
Table 5 presents our results from considering the two types of tax reforms. With standard
preferences, we obtain the usual result that consumption taxation dominates income taxation.
However, with spirit of capitalism preferences we ¯nd the opposite { the social welfare function is
higher under the income tax regime. Welfare gains are large for either type of change; the extremely
large increases observed for the spirit of capitalism households are partially attributable to the large
increase in wealth. While all households bene¯t from the additional consumption ¯nanced out of
permanently-higher wages, the soc households get an additional direct bonus. It turns out that
this direct e®ect is the crucial component to the welfare reversal. Although we do not show them
for the sake of brevity, plots of the cumulative distributions of consumption and leisure for the two
types of preferences change in essentially identical ways for each type of tax reform. Both income
and consumption tax reform produce FSD shifts in the distributions, with the consumption shift
17being larger for the income tax reform and the leisure shift being larger for the consumption tax
reform.16 The net result would be that the consumption tax reform gets preferred because the
shift in leisure is quantitatively more important for welfare (note the relatively large weight on
leisure relative to consumption { ¹ > 1 in both calibrated equilibria).
With spirit of capitalism preferences, we must also consider the e®ects on the distribution
of wealth when exploring changes in welfare. Figure 5 presents the cumulative distributions of
wealth in the soc case for three di®erent tax systems { the benchmark progressive tax system, the
°at income tax, and the °at consumption tax. The cumulative distributions for the two tax reforms
cross exactly once, but the area between them is not larger to the left of the intersection than to the
right, meaning there is no ranking according to stochastic dominance of the second degree.17 We
have been unable to rank the two distributions according to any known stochastic ordering rule,
meaning that our model's conclusions may not be robust to alternative parameterizations, but the
¯nding is still unique in the literature.
5. Conclusion
This paper has explored the e®ect of 'spirit of capitalism' preferences for the wealth distribution in
a model with incomplete asset markets. Our ¯rst result is that increasing the demand for status
has a strong negative e®ect on wealth inequality, whether measured by the standard deviation or
the Gini coe±cient on wealth, but a positive e®ect on consumption inequality. As the demand for
status increases, the wealth distribution actually converges to a single point due to a combination
of risk aversion and a shrinking discount factor; when the discount factor is held constant, the
distribution shrinks and shifts to the right. When we consider the likely possibility that status is
16'FSD' means stochastic dominance in the ¯rst-order sense:
EF [u(X)] ¸ EG [u(X)]
for all increasing functions u, which has the equivalent representation
F (x) · G(x) 8x:
The de¯nition is from Hadar and Russell (1969).
17'SSD' means that
EF [u(X)] ¸ EG [u(X)]







This comes from Hadar and Russell (1969) and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1971).
18instead a luxury good, we ¯nd that making the utility function more nonhomothetic increases in
Gini coe±cient on wealth; these e®ects can be strong if the constant in the utility function (which
has an interpretation in terms of the amount of capital needed before an agent buys status) is
larger than the average stock of wealth in the economy. However, it cannot produce a higher Gini
coe±cient than the case of no demand for status. Increasing the risk aversion of households does
not qualitatively a®ect our results.
Our tax experiments suggest that spirit of capitalism preferences have important policy impli-
cations. In particular, we ¯nd that the presence of wealth in the utility function can reverse the
welfare rankings of consumption versus income taxes; spirit of capitalism households would prefer
an income tax. In addition, removing the progressive tax in our economy actually leads to less,
not more, income inequality, and the change is much larger for the soc case. While we recognize
that critical features of the tax-transfer system in the US are missing from our model, and thus
it does not provide an accurate measure of the consequences of °at-tax reform, it does call into
question the robustness of experiments such as those carried out in Casta~ neda, D¶ ³az-Gim¶ enez, and
R¶ ³os-Rull (2002) and Conesa and Krueger (2004). More investigation along the lines of Carroll
(2002), in which the behavior of the wealthy is qualitatively di®erent from the poor, would seem to
be called for in order to provide clear tests of the strength of the spirit of capitalism motive. Our
results, in parallel to those in Reiter (2004), suggest that this distinction may be hard to obtain.
In previous versions of this paper, we considered the impact of spirit of capitalism preferences
on business cycles. Using the algorithm from Young (2003), we introduced aggregate productivity
shocks into the model. While this initial exploration was somewhat disappointing in that it failed to
produce any signi¯cant changes in the behavior of the model, we think it is advisable to revisit this
issue for the following reasons. First, our results here suggest that the behavior of the aggregate
labor input is impacted by the spirit of capitalism in complicated ways. Furthermore, the nature
of the e®ects of progressive income taxation are also dependent on the presence of status terms in
the utility function, even when economies are calibrated to produce the same wealth/GDP ratio
and aggregate hours worked. The e®ects of progressive income taxation over the business cycle
have not really been studied within a fully-heterogeneous dynamic general equilibrium model, but
it appears that the e±cacy of such taxes in performing their role as an automatic stabilizer may
be a®ected by the spirit of capitalism, as well as the desireability of such policies. Since our initial
investigation featured inelastic labor supply, we feel that reopening this inquiry is appropriate.
Furthermore, initial investigations imply that the welfare costs of business cycles are not invariant
19to the presence of spirit of capitalism, so we intend to extend the work of Krusell and Smith (2002)
as well.
In addition, we think it advisable to consider the asset pricing implications of our model. In
Krusell and Smith (1997), the asset pricing behavior of their benchmark model with exogenous
labor supply and aggregate shocks was shown to be quite poor. The essence of the problem is that
only a small fraction of agents price bonds in their economy, and these agents are quite well-insured.
As a result, their marginal rates of substitution do not vary much in equilibrium, creating very
little improvement in the failures of the complete markets model; this anomaly was not resolved by
the introduction of stochastic discount factors. Introducing spirit of capitalism preferences could
potentially alter the nature of asset pricing within their model, since it implies that the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution is likely to be countercyclical (see our appendix). This change might be
particularly pronounced if status is a luxury good, as it would imply sharp behavioral di®erences
for wealthy versus poor households. Indeed, we hope that such departures do occur, as they would
provide the profession with a tool for determining whether spirit of capitalism can be distinguished
from standard preferences.
206. Appendix
In this appendix we show that for the class of utility used in this paper, u(c;s;l) = [c(s+°)µl¹]
1¡¾
1¡¾ ,
















With ° > 0 and µ < 1:0 (with ¾ ¸ 1) we have ´s > ´c; that is, the marginal utility of status
declines less with wealth than the marginal utility of consumption does. In other words, as wealth
rises so does the fraction of current utility derived from status.
We next compute the EIS for our preference speci¯cation. Let status be simply given by current
capital. The Euler equation can be written
uc (ct;st;lt) = ¯Et [uc (ct+1;st+1;lt+1)(1 + rt+1) + us (ct+1;st+1;lt+1)]: (A2)
Using our functional forms this becomes
c¡¾
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since lt is constant in the steady state path. Following Kongsamut, Rebelo, and Xie (2001), we




























2 < 0: (A6)
Using this result we have
1 = ¯
·













Taking logs we obtain









Thus, there is a wedge between the EIS and 1
¾; the size of the wedge is directly related to µ. For
small enough values of µ and r we obtain

























That is, the EIS is smaller than the standard model with µ = 0. In addition, increases in ° increase
the EIS by decreasing the size of the wedge term, and as ° ! 1 the EIS approaches the standard
value 1
¾. Essentially, the second term is only relevant for agents who are not constrained in status;
with ° > 0 this constraint binds at positive income levels.
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25Table 1a
Moments of Wealth Distribution
° = 0 (Wealth not a Luxury Good)
Models Gini mean (k) std. (k) skew (k) kurt. (k) max (k) min (k)
µ = 0 0:5518 15:6099 16:7764 1:6154 6:0583 156:0399 0:0000
µ = 0:1 0:3154 15:4645 9:1320 1:2950 5:1835 87:6268 0:9702
µ = 0:5 0:1927 15:2839 5:3948 0:9777 4:3469 48:9794 3:6107
µ = 1:0 0:1635 15:2318 4:5292 0:8619 4:0519 39:6176 5:0510
µ = 5:0 0:1392 15:1973 3:8235 0:7452 3:7469 32:1762 6:4912
Table 1b
Moments of Consumption Distribution
° = 0 (Wealth not a Luxury Good)
Models Gini mean (c) std. (c) skew (c) kurt. (c)
µ = 0 0:1042 1:0195 0:2069 ¡0:0764 3:1841
µ = 0:1 0:1083 1:0092 0:2133 0:3362 3:0304
µ = 0:5 0:1176 0:9974 0:2274 0:5859 3:3628
µ = 1:0 0:1224 0:9940 0:2328 0:6524 3:5038
µ = 5:0 0:1316 0:9917 0:2409 0:7156 3:6598
Table 1c
Moments of Hours Distribution
° = 0 (Wealth not a Luxury Good)
Models Gini mean (h) std. (h) skew (h) kurt. (h) corr (h;y)
µ = 0 ¡0:0761 0:3271 0:1220 ¡0:8120 3:5079 0:6386
µ = 0:1 ¡0:0379 0:3271 0:1020 ¡0:7449 3:7351 0:6547
µ = 0:5 ¡0:0168 0:3271 0:0851 ¡0:7112 3:9259 0:6223
µ = 1:0 ¡0:0117 0:3271 0:0817 ¡0:6900 3:9333 0:5997
µ = 5:0 ¡0:0078 0:3271 0:0853 ¡0:6480 3:8482 0:5437
26Table 2a
Moments of Wealth Distribution, Fixed (¯;¹;±)
° = 0 (Wealth not a Luxury Good)
Models Gini mean (k) std. (k) skew (k) kurt. (k) max (k) min (k)
µ = 0:1 0:3087 21:3803 12:2622 1:2045 4:8681 116:1923 1:2102
µ = 0:5 0:1846 44:1167 14:7631 0:8292 3:9025 139:4767 8:8917
µ = 1:0 0:1484 70:9451 18:9538 0:6981 3:6215 185:5656 20:1739
µ = 5:0 0:0970 199:3871 34:5612 0:5134 3:2994 392:7253 91:4675
Table 2b
Moments of Consumption Distribution, Fixed (¯;¹;±)
° = 0 (Wealth not a Luxury Good)
Models Gini mean (c) std. (c) skew (c) kurt. (c)
µ = 0:1 0:0984 1:0966 0:2094 0:2224 2:9428
µ = 0:5 0:0901 1:2466 0:2167 0:3637 3:0390
µ = 1:0 0:0835 1:2861 0:2056 0:3845 3:0677
µ = 5:0 0:0667 0:9357 0:1174 0:3780 3:0819
Table 2c
Moments of Hours Distribution, Fixed (¯;¹;±)
° = 0 (Wealth not a Luxury Good)
Models Gini mean (h) std. (h) skew (h) kurt. (h) corr (h;y)
µ = 0:1 ¡0:0266 0:3415 0:1087 ¡0:6872 3:6196 0:7237
µ = 0:5 0:0002 0:3919 0:1048 ¡0:7079 3:8594 0:7849
µ = 1:0 0:0060 0:4451 0:1028 ¡0:7631 4:0966 0:8111
µ = 5:0 0:0055 0:6761 0:0703 ¡0:8253 4:2666 0:8561
27Table 3a
Moments of Wealth Distribution
° = 15:6 (Wealth a Luxury Good)
Models Gini mean (k) std. (k) skew (k) kurt. (k) max (k) min (k)
µ = 0:1 0:4856 15:6152 14:2362 1:3120 4:9313 124:5939 0:0000
µ = 0:5 0:3689 15:5625 10:4351 0:9284 3:9717 84:7462 0:0000
µ = 1:0 0:2666 15:4426 7:4519 0:7893 3:8303 59:7815 0:0000
Table 3b
Moments of Consumption Distribution
° = 15:6 (Wealth a Luxury Good)
Models Gini mean (c) std. (c) skew (c) kurt. (c)
µ = 0:1 0:1037 1:0196 0:2053 0:0912 3:2430
µ = 0:5 0:1072 1:0157 0:2100 0:4054 3:2914
µ = 1:0 0:1140 1:0077 0:2196 0:5703 3:3592
Table 3c
Moments of Hours Distribution
° = 15:6 (Wealth a Luxury Good)
Models Gini mean (h) std. (h) skew (h) kurt. (h) corr (h;y)
µ = 0:1 ¡0:0643 0:3271 0:1192 ¡0:7455 3:4243 0:6571
µ = 0:5 ¡0:0433 0:3271 0:1119 ¡0:6744 3:3950 0:6641
µ = 1:0 ¡0:0265 0:3271 0:1014 ¡0:6633 3:5422 0:6421
28Table 4a
Moments of Wealth Distribution
° = 0 (Wealth not a Luxury Good), High Risk Aversion ¾ = 4:0
Models Gini mean (k) std. (k) skew (k) kurt. (k) max (k) min (k)
µ = 0:0 0:4117 15:2498 11:5249 1:0734 4:1837 98:1800 0:0000
µ = 0:1 0:2969 15:2122 8:1976 0:9052 3:9013 72:9747 0:2401
Table 4b
Moments of Consumption Distribution
° = 0 (Wealth not a Luxury Good), High Risk Aversion ¾ = 4:0
Models Gini mean (c) std. (c) skew (c) kurt. (c)
µ = 0:0 0:0744 0:9951 0:2206 0:5167 3:4784
µ = 0:1 0:0767 0:9918 0:2244 0:6047 3:5264
29Table 5
Income Tax Experiments
(µ;°) ¢mean (k) ¢Gini (k) ¢mean (c) ¢Gini (c) ¢mean(h) ¢corr(h;y) Á
(0:0;0:0) 54:098% ¡0:721% 0:289% 19:769% 25:226% ¡17:374% 16:6%
(0:5;32) 57:174% ¡4:881% 29:088% 18:852% 26:006% ¡14:673% 28:4%
Consumption Tax Experiments
(µ;°) ¢mean (k) ¢Gini (k) ¢mean (c) ¢Gini (c) ¢mean(h) ¢corr(h;y) Á
(0:0;0:0) 31:815% 3:410% 9:742% 6:602% 5:321% ¡0:556% 18:1%
(0:5;32) 48:241% ¡8:270% 12:727% 2:711% 6:138% 5:198% 6:6%
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357. Computational Appendix (Not For Publication)
In this appendix we detail the solution method used in this paper. It is very similar to the appendix
from Young (2004), so that the reader need not consult both. The accuracy of the solution method
used here is discussed in Young (2003).
7.1. Solving the Consumer Problem
We wish to implement a solution that has a continuous state space. However, the all-too-common
linear-quadratic methods will fail here; one, they fail because the uncertainty in income is large
across idiosyncratic states, and two, the borrowing constraint does not bind in every state of the
world. We therefore detail now a solution method that builds a nonlinear smooth approximation
to the value function.
First, we select a grid in the k direction. For the k direction the value function will have a good
deal of curvature, particularly near the borrowing constraint and for high values of ¾. Therefore,
we choose a large number of grid points, typically between 100-200, and space them such that the
majority of points are near the borrowing constraint. Having chosen the grid we now wish to
construct an approximate value function. From the previous iteration on the Bellman equation we
have the value function exactly at the grid points. We then construct Schumaker splines through
the grid points. Schumaker splines are piecewise quadratic polynomials with knots placed on the
interior of each segment in such a way as to preserve monotonicity and concavity. With high
degrees of risk aversion, standard cubic splines display internodal oscillations which violate the
monotonicity and concavity properties of the value function; under such circumstances, it would
be di±cult to preserve the stability of the Bellman operator since obtaining the true optimum
would require robust global optimization methods. With our approximation scheme, we preserve
monotonicity and concavity, allowing us to employ gradient methods; it is also possible to show
that the approximate Bellman operator is a contraction since our approximation is linear in the
function values at the ¯xed grid points.
Having chosen an approximation for v (k;y), we then solve the equation
















subject to the constraint
k0 ¸ 0: (7.2)
36The labor supply h is determined by the solution to the equation
u1 (c;s;1 ¡ h)wy ¡ u3 (c;s;1 ¡ h) · 0
= 0 if h > 0,
which is linear in (k;k0) and thus can be solved analytically. We use bisection to solve for the
optimal value k0. The Schumaker splines allow the calculation of v1 exactly at any value k0.
Denote the solutions by
k0 = ¼k (k;y) (7.3)
h = ¼h (k;y): (7.4)
We update the value function by







In the actual computation we use Howard's improvement routine to speed up convergence; this
routine solves once for the decision rules and then updates the value function several hundred




¯vn+1 (k;y) ¡ vn (k;y)
¯ ¯
¯ < ":
7.2. Constructing the Ergodic Set
We now want to use the decision rules from the consumers to compute the implied stationary
distribution. To do so, we solve the equation
















over a very ¯ne, evenly-spaced grid of 5000 points. Denote the decision rules (which will match the
ones before) by ¼k and ¼h again. Starting from an initial distribution of wealth and employment
status, we then use the decision rules to update this distribution.
18This procedure de¯nes a contraction mapping as well. However, it can be numerically unstable, so it was only
applied after the value function had converged to one decimal place.
37Let the initial distribution be ¡0 (k;y) and consider a point (k;y) in this distribution. Locate
the decision rule k0 = ¼k (k;y) in the grid and calculate the linear interpolation weight
! = 1 ¡
¼k (k;y) ¡ kl
kh ¡ kl
: (7.7)
Then the mass at (k;y) is "relocated" to the following points in the following portions:
¼yy0!¡0 (k;y) (7.8)
goes to new point (kl;y0) and
¼yy0 (1 ¡ !)¡0 (k;y) (7.9)
goes to new point (kh;y0). Looping over all points constructs a new distribution ¡1 (k;y). We
then check whether the process has converged:
sup
(k;y)
j¡1 (k;y) ¡ ¡0 (k;y)j < "?







and check whether the implied interest rate equals the one taken as given:
r(K;N) ¡ r = 0?
If not, we update r using Brent's method until convergence. Brent's method takes upper and lower
bounds on r and uses inverse quadratic interpolation to update the guess for the root; the bounds
are set arbitrarily since, as shown in the paper, there is not an easy upper bound and the lower
bound can actually be below ± when the demand for status is very strong. Whenever the updating
would jump outside the bounds, a bisection step is taken instead. During the computations, we
must check that the upper bound assumed for the grid of capital is not binding. However, we chose
to set the upper bound so high (about 80 times average wealth) that it was never encountered in
the computation of any equilibrium.
387.3. Policy Experiments
When solving the model with the progressive income tax, we cannot use the approach detailed
above to solve for the policy functions since labor supply functions are no longer linear. Instead,
we use a nested bisection procedure that chooses a value for h, obtains the value for k0 by bisection,
and then determines whether to adjust h up or down using a bisection rule and a numerical one-
sided derivative. Because the upper bound on h will never bind, we use a forward derivative. That
is, given an h ¯rst solve for k0 using the inequality








Denote the value of this action vector (k0;h) by f1. Then solve for k0
2 in the equation









where h2 = h + 1:0¡6 jhj. Denote the value of this action vector (k0
2;h2) by f2. If f2 exceeds f1,
then the bisection bounds are adjusted to raise h, otherwise to lower it. We never compute the





because the value is not needed for the adjustment of the bisection bounds and the calculation will
be inaccurate since we must use forward derivatives. While this approach may be slower than
alternatives, it is very robust.19
For the income tax experiments, we are careful to use the exact same convergence tolerance for
both the initial and terminal steady states, so as not to contaminate the result with numerical error.
We ¯rst calibrate the initial economy using the progressive tax system; we retain the parameters
(¯;¹) for future use. We then resolve the economy with a °at tax for the return r and the tax rate
¿, using the (¯;¹) obtained in the calibration step. The tax rate is forced to satisfy the government
budget constraint
¿ ((r ¡ ±)K + wN) = gY
19If speed were a real concern, we could implement Brent's method in the solution of the Kuhn-Tucker conditions;
bisection has linear convergence while Brent's method can often obtain better rates than linear. Additional tricks
could be applied as well, but the computational time of the model is not that signi¯cant.
39so that government expenditures are the same fraction of GDP as before the reform. We use a
secant method to solve for the tax rate that balances the budget. The same procedure is used
to solve the consumption tax experiments, with the obvious change to the government budget
constraint:
¿cC = gY:
40